With the diversification, networking and intelligentization of Internet of Vehicles applications, the security offence surface of the Internet of Vehicles is being increasingly threatened. An important core component in the Internet of Vehicles is the T-Box (Telematics Box) control unit, which may be used to exchange the data information between the in-vehicle ECU (Electronic Control Unit) and the exterior of the vehicle. However, at present, the communication between the T-Box and the ECU is still transmitted on a CAN (Controller Area Network) bus in plaintext. The CAN bus communication technology does not consider the information security feature, and the transmission and reception of data packets are performed without authentication and data encryption.
Existing secure communication technologies such as SSL (Secure Socket Layer), IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) and S-HTTP (Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol) generally use a symmetric or an asymmetric algorithm to encrypt data and use authentication techniques to perform a unidirectional or a bidirectional authentication on both communication entities. However, the existing bidirectional authentication solution not only has many interactive processes, but also uses a complex encryption algorithm, while the T-Box device and the ECU device in the Internet of Vehicles are both resource-intensive embedded system devices, causing much difficulty in applying the existing security technical solutions to the certification and communication of the T-Box and the ECU.
How to implement a secure communication between the T-Box and the vehicle ECU has become an urgent technical problem to be solved, when faced with the risk that hackers may remotely control the T-Box, and attack by intercepting the communication content between the T-Box and the vehicle ECU.